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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. : 
DAVID E. HUNSAKER : Case No. 20030593-CA 
Defendant/Appellant 
INTRODUCTION 
The State's brief illustrates that this Court cannot viably construct the Internet 
enticement statute's contradictory requirements without ignoring that statute's plain 
language. The State fails to reconcile the Utah cases that have addressed similar 
language, does not account for the legislature's recent elimination of the contradictory 
phrase, and offers no other possible interpretation that saves the statute. Because the 
Internet enticement statute is invalid in all its applications, only the legislature has 
authority to reconcile it. Mr. Hunsaker preserved this separation of powers argument by 
specifically and timely objecting and then citing the relevant legal authority that 
constitutionally requires the legislature to remedy the conflict. Because no construction 
salvages the Internet enticement statute, it necessarily follows that the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face. The statute's failure to define the elements that the 
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt further violate due process requirements. 
I. MR HUNSAKER ESTABLISHED BELOW AND ON 
APPEAL THAT ONLY THE LEGISLATURE HAS 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO REDRAFT THE 
CONTRADICTORY PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNET 
ENTICEMENT STATUTE. 
Despite the State's best efforts to reconcile the Internet enticement statute's 
conflicting requirements, that statute requires the State to prove both the nonexistence 
and the existence of the same conduct. Neither the State's citations to differing statutes 
nor its reliance on rules of statutory construction change that statute's defects without 
this Court either ignoring or amending the contradiction. The legislature's recent 
elimination of the conflicting language confirms the statute's hopelessly irreconcilable 
provisions. Defense counsel fully preserved these arguments below and correctly argued 
that the separation of powers doctrine bars this Court from ignoring or amending plain 
statutory language and, instead, requires the legislature to redraft contradictory statutes. 
A. The State's Inability to Show the Applicability 
of Other Cases Reiving on Similar Language 
and Its Failure to Offer Any Viable 
Alternative Constructions Establish the 
Internet Enticement Statute's Defects. 
Consistent with Mr. Hunsaker's arguments on appeal, the State offers no viable 
reading of the Internet enticement statute which avoids the plainly contradictory 
language. The State neglects to rebut Mr. Hunsaker's explication of the other statutes 
which have employed similar language but which promote policies inapplicable to this 
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case. The arguments that the State does raise fail to answer why the legislature recently 
eliminated the conflicting language if, as the State contends, the legislature intended to 
shield the Internet enticement statute from attack. The only way to reconcile the Internet 
enticement's statute's contradictory language is to ignore the conflicting language or to 
redraft the statute. This Court lacks power to exclude plain but contradictory statutory 
language or to re-write statutes as the State seems to propose. 
On appeal, the State does not contest Mr. Hunsaker's plain language and 
definitional analyses, his showing that the Internet enticement statute targets the exact 
same conduct as the attempt and solicitation statutes, or the absence of legislative history. 
Instead, the State primarily focuses on the Utah cases that have construed statutes 
containing similar "not amounting toM language to reconcile the Internet enticement 
statute's contradictory provisions. State's Brief at 9-11. But, the State's discussion of 
these cases overlooks Mr. Hunsaker's explanation that the Internet enticement statute 
does not encourage the filing of more serious charges unlike the legislature's intent in 
those cases. Appellant's Brief at 19-23 (distinguishing those cases). Instead, the State 
contends that the legislature did not intend to require the State to prove the nonexistence 
of an attempt or solicitation because it presumably knew of the cases upholding the "not 
amounting to" language in the sex crime statutes. State's Brief at 11. The State offers 
the alternative explanation that the legislature included the "not amounting to" language 
to avoid violating State v. Shondeh 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969). State's Brief at 11-12. 
3 
These arguments provide no explanation for the legislature's recent decision to 
eliminate the contradictory language from the Internet enticement statute. If, as the State 
contends, the legislature knew of the cases construing similar language when it originally 
enacted the statute, the legislature would have intended that language to encourage the 
filing of more serious charges. See, e.g.. State v. Reed. 2000 UT 68, TJ33, 8 P.3d 1025. 
Assuming the legislature had such an intent, its removal of the very language that 
purportedly promoted the filing of more serious charges makes little sense. 
The State's contentions further fail to account for Mr. Hunsaker's arguments 
concerning why the legislature: (1) designated Internet enticement an inchoate offense 
rather than a lesser included sex offense; (2) punished the crime the same as an attempt 
or solicitation (one degree lower than the underlying crime); (3) did not otherwise 
encourage the filing of more serious charges; and, (4) "specifically designate[d]" Internet 
enticement as the applicable charge under Utah Code Annotated section 76-4-301 
(1999). Appellant's Brief at 20-23. At the very least, these numerous unanswered 
questions defeat the State's claimed presumption that the legislature relied on prior case 
law in including the "not amounting to language." State's Brief at 11 (citing cases on the 
presumption). 
The State's reference to Shondel is equally unpersuasive because that doctrine 
does not apply to the specific offense of Internet enticement. State's Brief at 11-12. 
"The Shondel doctrine applies only when a prosecutor can charge an individual with two 
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distinct crimes that have disparate penalties or classifications but identical elements, and 
the prosecutor's decision to charge either crime is founded solely upon the vagary of the 
prosecutor." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f!8, 52 P.3d 1194. In contrast, Internet 
enticement does not list "identical elements" to any other crime. IdL In addition to the 
"not amounting to" language," that statute requires a person to " knowingly use a 
computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or attempt to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a 
minor or a person the defendant believes to be a minor to engage in" unlawful sexual 
activity. Utah Code Ann. 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2001). Because no other statute includes 
these elements specifically relating to the Internet, Shondel is of no concern. 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f!8, 52 P.3d 1194. 
At best, the State can merely speculate about the reasons why the legislature 
established and then removed the contradictory requirements in the Internet enticement 
statute. The most obvious explanation is simply that the legislature unwittingly included 
the conflicting language in the original statute and then later recognized the 
irreconcilable requirements it had enacted. In any event, the legislature's actions support 
Mr. Hunsaker's assertion that the legislature recognized that the Internet enticement 
statute contained conflicting language. 
Ultimately, the legislature's intent is irrelevant because no other construction of 
the statute can reconcile the conflicting terms. Thus, even if Shondel or the cases 
addressing the "not amounting to" language motivated the legislature, that intent does not 
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obviate the plain contradiction the legislature created. The State's inability to offer a 
viable alternative interpretation without excluding the problematic language confirms the 
Internet enticement statute's irreconcilability. As Mr. Hunsaker has consistently argued, 
this Court must return statutes to the legislature when the only way to reconcile "patently 
inconsistent" statutory provisions is to "render certain viable parts meaningless and 
void." Nelson v. Salt Lake County. 905 P.2d 872. 875-76 (Utah 1995). Because the 
legislature has already corrected the invalid statute, this Court should reverse Mr. 
Hunsaker's conviction under that faulty provision. 
B. The Rules of Statutory Construction Cannot 
Remedy Directly Contradictory Statutory 
Requirements. 
The State's reliance on rules of statutory construction to salvage the Internet 
enticement statute would similarly require this Court to unconstitutionally ignore or 
redraft the contradictory language. The plain language doctrine forbids courts from 
labeling plain statutory terms as mere surplusage, even to avoid constitutional infirmities. 
This is especially true when construing the elements of a crime because lenity requires 
courts to give effect to statutory phrases. Because the plain requirements of the Internet 
enticement statute are irreconcilable, only the legislature can remedy that provision. 
The State first seeks to eliminate from the Internet enticement statute the phrase 
"'not amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation'" by asserting that the "plain 
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language of th[e] statute . . . contains no commands at all." State's Brief at 9 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) Supp. 2001)). To the contrary, this language plainly 
excludes those enumerated inchoate offenses from the scope of the Internet enticement 
statute. That exclusion, in turn, plainly contradicts the definition of Internet enticement 
that follows of soliciting or attempting to solicit illegal sexual activity. IcL_ The State 
groundlessly argues that this language is clear. State's Brief at 9. Even the trial judge 
conceded that the conflicting language caused him to "scratch[]" his head and that the 
statute was not "a model of clarity." R. 147: 2, 11. 
The State further presupposes that statutory language must be mandatory to be 
plain or to serve as an element of a criminal offense. State's Brief at 9. The State 
provides no support for this assertion. To the contrary, courts must make every effort to 
"avoid construing a statute so as to render a provision mere surplusage." Burrus v. 
Vegliante. 336 F.3d 82, 91 (2nd Cir. 2003); see Jones v. United States. 529 U.S. 848, 857 
(2000); Ratzlafv. United States. 510 U.S. 135, 140-141 (1994). Courts are particularly 
vigilant when language fl'describe[s] an element of a criminal offense.'" Jones , 529 U.S. 
at 857 (quoting Ratzlaf. 510 U.S. at 140-141). Such "heightened" concern is necessary 
"because of the related principles that courts may not create crimes and that criminal 
statutes must be strictly construed in favor of lenity." IcL; O'Neil v. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. 220 F.3d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Thus, this 
Court cannot disregard the "not amounting to" language as "'superfluous or 
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inoperative.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, lf52, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Hall v.Utah 
State Dept. of Corr.. 2001 UT 34,1J15, 24 P.3d 958). 
Stripping away the State's plain-language arguments reveals its failure to 
acknowledge and confront the problematic language in violation of the plain language 
doctrine. That doctrine requires courts to apply the plain language of statutes unless the 
language is ambiguous. State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, TJ6, 57 P.3d 1134. In 
determining whether statutory language is plain, appellate courts must "presume that the 
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its 
ordinary and accepted meaning." Alpine Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
2000 UT App 319, [^12, 14 P.3d 125 (quoting Hall. 2001 UT 34, TJ15, 24 P.3d 958). 
Disregarding the "not amounting to" language violates this directive. The State 
essentially requests this Court to "'render portions of [the] statute superfluous or 
inoperative5" to save it. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1J52, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Nelson , 905 
P.2d at 875). Courts cannot "construe a statute in such a way as to render certain viable 
parts meaningless and void." Nelson, 905 P.2d at 876. Only the legislature can "'rewrite 
a statute, supply omissions, or make other changes'" to plain but contradictory statutory 
language. State v. Hamilton, 340 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Neb. 1983)(quoting Bessey v. Board 
of Educational Lands & Funds. 178 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Neb. 1970)). 
The State justifies disregarding the Internet enticement statute's contradictory 
terms as necessary to avoid constitutional difficulties. State's Brief at 13. But, courts 
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cannot avoid addressing constitutional questions under the "' guise of construction '" 
Hamilton. 340 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Neb. 1983) (quoting Bessev. 178 N.W.2d 794, 797 
(Neb. 1970)). Doing so risks npress[ing] statutory construction fto the point of 
disingenuous evasion1 [] to avoid a constitutional question." Miller v. French . 530 U.S. 
327, 341 (2000) (quoting United States v. Locke. 471 U.S. 84, 96, (1985)). Because no 
"reasonable basis" exists upon which to constitutionally construe the Internet enticement 
statute without redrafting it, this Court cannot disregard the plainly conflicting 
requirements for the sake of avoiding constitutional disputes. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 
991, 1009 (Utah 1995). Instead, as discussed more fully below, this case squarely 
invokes the legislature's "province" to amend or re-write irreconcilable statutes. 
Lastly, the State contends that this Court must reject Mr. Hunsaker's construction 
of the Internet enticement statute to avoid "absurd" results. State's Brief at 13-14. The 
State premises this argument on its faulty assumption that the Internet enticement statute 
is plain and not contradictory. This argument is less than persuasive especially when the 
State presents no viable reading of the statute without resorting to ignoring the 
contradictory language. Contrary to the State's assumptions, the impossibility of 
reconciling the contradictory language of the Internet enticement statute, renders Mr. 
Hunsaker's construction as "the only reasonable one." State's Brief at 14. 
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C. Defense Counsel Repeatedly Preserved the 
Applicable Law that Constitutionally Requires 
The Legislature to Redraft Conflicting 
Statutes. 
Defense counsel preserved the necessity of legislative redrafting under the 
separation-of-powers doctrine by repeatedly arguing that only the legislature had 
authority to remedy the Internet enticement statute. Defense counsel fully informed the 
trial judge that Nelson required the legislature, rather than the courts, to remedy the 
irreconcilable contradiction here. Moreover, Nelson's remedy requiring legislative 
action is indisputably based on basic separation of powers principles. Independent of 
Nelson, defense counsel specifically requested the trial judge to rule on the separation of 
powers argument after the judge failed to mention that issue in his ruling. Invited error 
does not apply here because defense counsel did not lead the trial judge into err. To the 
contrary, counsel provided the trial judge multiple opportunities to correctly resolve the 
constitutional claim, in full harmony with the preservation rule. 
The defense motion to strike the Internet enticement statute and counsel's 
arguments in the trial court specifically preserved Mr. Hunsaker's appellate claim that 
only the legislature had authority to remedy the Internet enticement statute. To preserve 
an issue for appeal, it "must be raised in a timely fashion, must be specifically raised such 
that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court, and 
must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." State v. Schultz. 2002 UT 
App 366, [^19, 58 P.3d 879 (quotations and citations omitted). These requirements 
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promote giving trial judges the first opportunity to address a claimed error and prevent 
parties from strategically foregoing an objection to enhance the chances for success on 
appeal. State v. Richins. 2004 UT App 36, TJ8, 86 P.3d 759. 
In contrast, parties may waive appellate issues when counsel, "either by statement 
or act, affirmatively represents] to the court that he or she had no objection" to the 
challenged issue. State v. Hamilton. 2003 UT 22, [^54, 70 P.3d 111. Although an 
"inadvertent" act or statement may cause waiver, an invited error only occurs when 
counsel's conduct "affirmatively" "led the trial court into its erroneous action." State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ |12, 86 P.3d 742. No technical actions are required to satisfy 
the preservation rule as long as the trial court has an "opportunity" to correctly decide the 
issue. State v. Cram. 2002 UT 37. T|10. 46 P.3d 230. 
The State concedes that defense counsel preserved a "non-constitutional claim" 
under Nelson but contends that counsel failed to preserve that the separation of powers 
doctrine required legislative redrafting. State's Brief at 5-7. The State mistakes both the 
nature of Mr. Hunsaker's arguments and the preservation doctrine itself. In the trial 
court and on appeal, Mr. Hunsaker focuses on the standards enunciated in Nelson for 
determining whether a statute is "patently inconsistent" or "contradictory." Nelson, 905 
P.2d at 876; see R. 56-59; Appellant's Brief at 12-20. Mr. Hunsaker also accurately 
represents that Nelson holds that it is the sole "province" of the legislature to remedy 
contradictory statutes. 905 P.2d at 876; see R. 56-59; Appellant's Brief at 12-20. 
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The State erroneously construes Nelson as not invoking the separation of powers 
doctrine. State's Brief at 6. To the contrary, Nelson specifically relies on separation of 
powers principles in explaining the remedy for resolving contradictory statutes. 905 P.2d 
at 876. That case specifically bars courts from rendering plain statutory language 
"meaningless and void" because it "lies within the province of our legislature " to 
reconcile contradictory statutes. Id. Nelson similarly holds that were courts to choose 
which conflicting statutory "statement controls," this Court would engage in "legislation 
by judicial fiat" in direct violation of the separation of powers doctrine. IdL 
This discussion of the remedy for contradictory statutes plainly invokes the 
separation of powers doctrine. Delineating the "province of the legislature" directly 
relies upon the rationale underlying the separation of powers doctrine of barring one 
branch of government from "exercising any of the functions reserved to another branch 
of government." Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.. 953 
P.2d 435, 443 (Utah 1997) (construing Utah Constitution, Article V, section 1). Utah 
appellate courts have eliminated any doubt about the meaning of a branch of 
government's "province" by repeatedly relying on that term when defining the three 
branches' powers. See, e.g.. Mohi. 901 P.2d at 1009; State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390, 397 
(Utah 1989); State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), overruled on 
other grounds on certiorari review. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
There should be no concern that Nelson failed to quote the separation of powers 
12 
doctrine because Nelson's holding is so obvious. It is axiomatic under that doctrine that 
one branch of government cannot exercise the powers belonging to another. Evans & 
Sutherland Computer Corp., 953 P.2d at 443. For that very reason, courts "may not 
create crimes " O'Neil 220 F.3d at 1360. Hurley Trucking Co. v. State. 39 P.3d 
527, 531 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (judges lack authority to "throw[] away" plain statutory 
terms). 
When defense counsel explained Nelson's holding that it is the legislature's 
"province" to remedy contradictory statutes, he "specifically raised" the separation of 
powers doctrine. R. 56-59; 147: 5; Schultz. 2002 UT App 366,1fl9, 58 P.3d 879. 
Defense counsel clearly explained that Nelson's remedy bars courts from "re-writing the 
law." R. 147: 8. Thus, counsel preserved his claim that the separation of powers 
doctrine requires the legislature to redraft the Internet enticement statute, see. Schultz, 
2002 UT App 366, ^19, 58 P.3d 879. 
Regardless of Nelson's plain holding, defense counsel otherwise "specifically" 
preserved his separation of powers argument. Schultz., 2002 UT App 366, ^ }19, 58 P.3d 
879. In the motion to strike the Internet enticement statute, defense counsel specifically 
cited Nelson as requiring legislative redrafting "[b]ased on the separation of powers 
doctrine. . .." R. 56. He also repeatedly characterized the Internet enticement statute's 
contradictory language as "unconstitutional" and requiring the trial court to "return [the 
statute] to the legislature for correction." R. 54, 56-58. Counsel then reiterated these 
13 
same themes at the hearing on the motion. R. 147: 5-7. 
Nevertheless, the State dismisses counsel's repeated arguments and contends, 
instead, that the trial judge failed to understand the "constitutional basis11 for Mr. 
Hunsaker's separation of powers argument. State's Brief at 6. The hearing transcript 
does not support the State's claims. Before defense counsel could even speak at the 
hearing, the trial judge summarized Mr. Hunsaker's argument as the Internet enticement 
statute creating "an irreconcilable conflict that makes the statute unconstitutional under 
Nelson... ." R. 147: 2. Defense counsel then reiterated his arguments that Nelson 
constitutionally required the trial judge to return the Internet enticement statute for 
redrafting. Id. at 5-8. Even the prosecutor emphasized the constitutional nature of the 
argument. Id. at 10. Thus, the trial judge plainly understood the constitutional 
arguments under Nelson. 
The State further faults defense counsel for failing to "correct" the trial judge's 
understanding of the arguments. Id. But, as the record demonstrates, defense counsel 
did request the trial judge to clarify the basis for his ruling. The trial judge ruled that the 
statute was "sufficiently clear" and did not violate "due process" principles. Id. at 10. 
Because the trial judge found no conflict, he had no reason to proceed to address 
Nelson's prescribed legislative remedy. Nevertheless, defense counsel requested the trial 
judge to clarify whether the judge's ruling that the statute was clear also resolved the 
argument for "legislative redrafting." R. 147: 11. The trial judge agreed that it did. Id_ 
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These proceedings prove that the trial judge not only understood the separation of 
powers argument, but that defense counsel independently preserved that issue for appeal. 
Defense counsel interrupted the trial judge and asked him to specifically rule on that 
doctrine when the trial failed to address it in his initial ruling. Thus, contrary to the 
State's claims, defense counsel did "correct" the trial judge and obtained a ruling 
specifically addressing the necessity for legislative action. State's Brief at 13. 
In any event, defense counsel did not invite the trial judge to err because he never 
"affirmatively" "led the trial court into its erroneous action." Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, 
^fl2, 86 P.3d 742. Defense counsel made no "statement or act" that led the trial judge to 
erroneously concluded that the Internet enticement statute was plain and did not require 
legislative redrafting. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ [54, 70 P.3d 111. To the contrary, 
defense counsel timely and specifically objected, repeatedly cited the applicable law, and 
even requested the trial judge to specifically rule on the separation of powers issue. 
Rather than inviting error, counsel's actions gave the trial judge ample "opportunity" to 
correctly decide the issues. Cram, 2002 UT 37, TflO, 46 P.3d 230. 
II. BECAUSE THE INTERNET ENTICEMENT STATUTE 
CONTRADICTS IN ALL POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS, IT 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE ON ITS FACE. 
Because the Internet enticement statute cannot be reconciled without omitting or 
amending its plain language, it is necessarily unconstitutionally vague on its face. When 
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a statute is invalid in all its applications, a challenger may argue that a statute is facially 
vague, irrespective of the challenger's particular situation. Accordingly, Mr. Hunsaker 
properly challenges the Internet enticement statute as unconstitutionally vague. 
The State erroneously argues that this Court must limit Mr. Hunsaker5s vagueness 
challenge "as applied to the challenger's conduct." State's Brief at 17. Persons may 
challenge a statute as facially vague when the statute "proscribe^] no comprehensible 
course of conduct" and, as such, the statute "may not be constitutionally applied to any 
set of facts. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975). Such broad facial 
challenges are desirable because "the very existence of some statutes may cause persons 
not before the Court to refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or 
expression." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976). Utah 
appellate courts agree that any person may facially challenge a statute as "vague is all its 
applications." State v. MacGuire. 2004 UT 4,1J12, 84 P.3d 1171; see. State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Because Mr. Hunsaker argues that the Internet enticement statute creates an 
"irreconcilable contraction," he necessarily asserts that the statute is "vague in all its 
applications." Nelson, 905 P.2d at 876; Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 
816, 819 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, the State misfires when it claims that Mr. Hunsaker 
must show that the Internet enticement statute is vague as applied to his case. As shown 
throughout these proceedings, that statute cannot be reconciled without omitting its plain 
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language or amending the statute. The State tacitly admits this conclusion by failing to 
offer a single viable reading of the statute. The Internet enticement statute's complete 
fallibility in all applications, renders it unconstitutionally vague on its face. Powell, 423 
U.S. at 92; Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 928. 
III. THE CONFLICTING LANGUAGE OF THE INTERNET 
ENTICEMENT STATUTE PREVENTS A REASONABLE 
JURY FROM FINDING GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
For the reasons stated in the opening brief and discussed above, Mr. Hunsaker 
reiterates that no reasonable juror could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under 
the inexplicable language of the Internet enticement statute. State v. Waldron, 2002 UT 
App 175, TJ10, 51 P.3d 21. This violation of Mr. Hunsaker's due process rights provides 
an independent basis for reversing his conviction. IdL 
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CONCLUSION 
The Internet enticement statute is irreconcilably inconsistent, unconstitutionally 
vague on its face, and violates the due process right to be proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Because the legislature has already eliminated the contradictory 
language, this Court should simply reverse Mr. Hunsaker's convictions 
SUBMITTED this 7 ^ day of May, 2004. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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